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Abstract
We develop a unifying framework to integrate two of organizational soci-
ology’s theory fragments on categorization: typecasting and form emer-
gence. Typecasting is a producer-level theory that considers the conse-
quences producers face for specializing versus spanning across category
boundaries. Form emergence considers the evolution of categories and
how the attributes of producers entering a category shapes its likelihood
of gaining legitimacy among relevant audiences. Both theory fragments
emerge from the processes audiences use to assign categorymemberships
to producers. In this paper,we develop this common foundation andclearly
outline the arguments that lead to central implications of each theory. We
formalize these arguments using modal expressions to represent key cat-
egorization processes and the theory-building framework developed by
Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll (2007).
∗We thank Glenn Carroll for comments and the Stanford Graduate School of Business and
Durham Business School for financial support.
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Categorization in market contexts has attracted considerable interest in recent
years, spurred in large part by Zuckerman’s (1999) seminal work in capital mar-
kets. Empirical work on this subject covers a range of topics, including cat-
egory emergence, proliferation, and erosion (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000;
Ruef 2000; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005; Bogaert, Boone, and Carroll 2006;
Pontikes 2008), the consequences of different categorical positions and category
structures for individual producers (Zuckerman and Kim 2003; Hsu, 2006; Ne-
gro, Hannan, and Rao 2008; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak 2008), and the role of au-
dience members in structuring understanding of categories (Boone, Declerck,
Rao, and Van Den Buys 2008; Koçak 2008; Koçak, Hannan, and Hsu 2008).
This paper focuses on two theory fragments, typecasting and form emer-
gence, which exemplify the different emphases in research approaches. Type-
casting theory focuses onwell-established categories and considers the implica-
tions for individual producers of specializing in versus generalizing across cat-
egorical boundaries (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, and von Rittman 2003). Re-
search suggests that audiences have an easier time making sense of specialists
but that a clear association with a single category restricts the range of future
opportunities.
Form-emergence theory considers how the attributes of producers associ-
atedwith an emerging category shapes its likelihood of gaining legitimacy among
relevant audiences (McKendrick and Carroll 2001; McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll,
and Khessina 2003). Work in this area finds that a category is more likely to be-
come a well-established form when new entrants have focused identities (as in
the case of de-novo entrants, the producers who begin as members of the cate-
gory).
These theory fragments have progressed largely independently of one an-
other. This is not surprising given differences in levels of analysis and key out-
comes. Yet, they are clearly conceptually connected. Both theory fragments ad-
dress the positioning of producers in a space of categories and the effect of such
positions on an audience’s understandings. In this paper, wefleshout these con-
nections to clarify the processes that lie at heart of theories of categorization.
In particular, demonstrate that a common foundation, a theory of partiality in
memberships, gives rise to predictions central to both of these fragments.
We use the formal theory-building tools and framework developed by Han-
nan, Pólos, and Carroll (2007) and extended by Pólos, Hannan, and Hsu (2008).
These accounts developed modal constructions that allow for subtle formaliza-
tion of key sociological concepts such as legitimation, identity, and social form,
which revolve around the beliefs held by relevant audiences. As we aim to illus-
trate, this approach to theory building has value for producing coherent, inte-
grative models of perceptions, defaults, and beliefs.
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We begin with a brief overview of key concepts from recent theoretical work
by Hannan et al. (2007) on category and form emergence. We extend this the-
ory to develop a theorem that fits the typecasting imagery developed by Zucker-
man and colleagues. Then, with a few additional considerations, we establish a
formal proof of a foundation for McKendrick and Carroll’s arguments regarding
form emergence.
1 Modal Models for Legitimation
Hannan et al. (2007) highlight the role of the audience in constructing organiza-
tional categories and assigning membership to them. Their theory considers a
domain as consisting of a dual role structure: producer (an agent whomakes of-
ferings in the domain) and audience member (an agent who evaluates offerings
and potentially rewards producers of offerings that they find appealing) and a
language.
The basic linguistic objects are labels that audience members apply to pro-
ducers. Accordingly, we begin with a labeling function, whichmaps from triplets
of audience members, producers, and time points to the powerset of the set of
available labels.1 We denote the set of labels that audience member y applies to
producer x at time t as l(x , y, t). If the audience member applies the label l to x
at time t , then l ∈ l(x , y, t).
Labels are often paired with schemas that tell what the label means to an
audience member. A schema thus establishes the meaning (or intension) of a
label.2 It provides an abstract model or representations of the feature values
that are consistent with a given label.
Formally, we represent schemas for labels as sets of formulas that pick out a
set of relevant features (or relations). We distinguish the values of those features
(or relations) that are consistent with membership in a label from those that are
not.3 Let fi = { f1, f2, . . . fi } be the indexed set of i features that are relevant for a
1The powerset of a set is the collection of all of its subsets. We refer the powerset here because
an audiencemember can apply multiple labels to the same object.
2In the tradition of logical semantics, intensions are functions that map possible worlds to
extensions. Some readersmightwonder if we depart from that tradition. We donot. Schemata tell
what rules should the entities satisfy to be full-fledgedmembers of a label. In different possible
worlds different entities satisfy the schemata; but in any possible world it is given who satisfies
them and to what extent. That is, schemata define the extensions of labels in all possible worlds
so they define the intension of the label.
3The ordering of elements in a listing of the membership of a set is generally arbitrary. Here
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schema. Each feature in the set has a range of possible values. We denote the set
of possible values of feature f j by rj and a value for an object at a time point as
f j ,x,t .
Definition 1 (Schema). A schema for a label maps pairs of audience members
and time points to an n-tuple of nonempty subsets of values of the relevant fea-
tures; this subset contains the schema-conforming feature values. (HPCDef. 3.1)4
σl : a× t−→P (r1)×·· ·×P (rI); σl (y, t) = 〈s1, . . . ,sI 〉 ≡ SI
where P (·) denotes the powerset (set of all subsets of a set), si is the set of all the
schema conforming values of the ith feature, and I is the total number of schema-
relevant features. The schema σ(l , y, t) is defined provided that l ∈ l(k, y, t).
A pair consisting of a label and a schema that tells its meaning is called a
type. As we will elaborate on later, in some cases audience members take con-
formity to their schema for a label of those bearing the label as a natural fact, as
taken for granted. A type for which taken-for-granted compliance is assumed is
called a concept.
Definition 2 (Type). A type is a function that maps from pairs of audience mem-
bers and timepoints to the powerset of theCartesian product of the set of available
labels and the set of available schemata. (HPC Def. 3.2)
ty : a× t−→P (l×S), such that (〈l ,SI 〉 ∈ ty(y, t))↔ (σ(l , y, t) = SI ).
From the definition of a schema as a function, it follows that atmost one schema
can be paired with a label. Therefore, types for labels are unique.
Notation. At this point in the argument, we must introduce quantification. The
theory onwhichwebuild states (some) definitions, postulates, auxiliary assump-
tions, lemmas, and theorems in a nonmonotonic logic (Pólos andHannan 2002,
2004). In formal terms, models of arguments are given in terms of sequences of
intensions of open formulas. It contains a formal language to represent causal
stories and defines a new kind of quantifier, denoted by N. Formulas quanti-
fied byN state what is expected to “normally” be the case according to a causal
we fix the ordering of elements by expressing the relevant sets of features and of their values as
indexed sets. Suppose we have a set x = {x1,x2, . . .xn} and a set I containing the first i natural
numbers: i= {0,1,2, . . .i }. We can express the indexed set xn = {xi | i ∈ n}.
4This notation refers to Definition 3.1 in Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll (2007).
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story. The normal case is what we assume to be the case if we lackmore specific
information that overrules the default. The implications of a set of rules with
exceptions, provisional theorems, are the logical consequences of a stage of a
theory. Provisional theorems have a haphazard existence: what can be derived
at one stage, might not be derivable in a later stage. So the status of a provisional
theorem differs from that of a causal story. The syntax of the second language
codes this difference. It introduces a “presumably” quantifier, denoted by P.
Sentences (formulas) quantified by P are provisional theorems at a stage of a
theory if they follow from the premises at that stage.
Our arguments rely partly on auxiliary assumptions, which make certain
analyses tractable. Because auxiliary assumptions have a different status from
causal claims that are believed to be true in the world, we mark them with a dif-
ferent quantifier, A (for “assumedly”). Their role in inference is the same as for
formula quantified withN.
Throughout this paper we assume that the reader is familiar with the dis-
tinction of free and bound variables, and we use this to establish the following
conventions.
1. The out-most quantifier of the formula, that is the quantifier whose scope
is the whole formula, binds all the free variables of the formula. This
allows us to omit the (sometimes long) lists of variables following these
quantifiers.
2. If the quantifier whose scope is the whole formula is universal, then we
omit thequantifier aswell, butwe still indicate its scopewith square brack-
ets.
Types can have positive, neutral, or negative valuation. For issues related
to typecasting, the interesting case concerns positive valuation. In such cases,
greater fit with an audience member’s schema yields greater intrinsic appeal, or
fit with her tastes for offerings of that type. Let α˜(l ,x , y, t) be a function that tells
the intrinsic appeal of the offering of producer x in type l to audience member
y at time point t .
Definition 3 (Positively valued type).
[PVT(l , y, t)↔∃SI [〈l ,SI 〉 ∈ ty(y, t)]
∧Nx ,x ′, y [(µi (x , y, t)>µi (x
′, y, t))→ E{α˜(l ,x , y, t)}> E{α˜(l ,x ′, y, t)}]].
Following several major lines of work in cognitive psychology and cognitive
science, we assume that assessments of producers’ membership can be partial,
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a matter of degree. Based on the configurations of features in a schema, an au-
dience member regards producers with certain configurations as full-fledged
members of a type (or category), others as having a moderate or low standing
as a member, and still others as completely outside the type boundary. The de-
gree to which the producer’s characteristics fit a schema is reflected in a grade
of membership (GoM) function. In particular, µi (l )(x , y, t) denotes the GoM of x
in the audiencemember y ’s “meaning” (intension) of the label l at time t . (Han-
nan et al. (2007) equate the GoM in the meaning of a label to the GoM in the
schema.)
1.1 Perception, Defaults, and Beliefs
An audience members’ experience with type members shapes the strength of
her schema for the type label. In some cases, an audience member may gen-
erally find type members to have a high GoM in the label—they display feature
values that fit well the relevant schema. This generic fit and low frequency of
observed misfits causes audience members to come to take for granted that the
behavior and structures of any producers for which they apply the type label are
completely consistent with the schema. Beliefs about schema conformity thus
become default assumptions of everyday life. This means the defaults are used
to fill in the many gaps in perceptions that come about from incomplete infor-
mation, unobservability, and ambiguity.
We introduce three modal operators—perception, default, and belief—to
analyze these issues. In logic, the term modality originally was used originally
to refer to qualities of the truth of an expression, especially the possibility and
necessity of a statement. The technical apparatus for analyzing logics with op-
erators for possibility and necessity has been generalized to treat statements
about an agent’s attitude toward an object or relation; and the term modality is
now generally extended to include expressions of perceptions, beliefs, and valu-
ations. We use this extended sense of modality.
We refer to an agent’s information state about a factual situation as a set of
beliefs. Perceptions contribute to beliefs in an immediate way; what agents di-
rectly perceive updates the set of beliefs that they hold. Thus, the temporal order
of perceptions matters: more recent perceptions replace older ones in case they
conflict. But agents’ perceptions are generally partial, making some proposi-
tions true and others false, while leaving open the truth/falsity of others. As such
partiality generates uncertainty, it is natural that mechanisms emerge that elim-
inate some of the gaps. Agents rely on defaults to “fill in” missing facts when the
value of a relevant fact direct perception is lacking and an applicable default is
available. That is, defaults shape beliefs only in the absence of current percep-
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tion of the facts in question. And although beliefs based on taken-for-granted
assumptions shape information states (and thus behavior), such defaults are ex-
posed to revision due to direct perceptions that conflict with the assumed facts.
In our substantive context, the audience members pay attention to the val-
ues of certain features of producers (or products) in a market. Our formal lan-
guage contains atomic formulas of the form: f (x , t)= v , where f refers a feature,
x to a product or producer, t to a time point, and v is a value of f .
To formally describe the interrelations of the three belief attitudes, we intro-
duce three new logical constants. These are defined for an (arbitrary) audience
member y and sentence (or formula) φ. We extend the standard “box” notation
for the necessity operator to denote these new logical constants:
P y φ stands for “The agent y perceives that φ is the case.”
D y φ stands for “The agent y takes for granted that φ is the case (in the ab-
sence of contrary perception).”
B y φ stands for “The agent y believes that φ is the case.”
Pólos et al. (2008) defined a model for the language containing these oper-
ators and provided their formal semantics. Their model was designed to satisfy
the following constraints:
1. perception is partial at all time points;
2. beliefs must be grounded in either perception or taken-for-granted as-
sumptions;
3. as seeing is believing, perception (at least temporarily) overrides earlier
beliefs;
4. defaults shapebeliefs (unless there is perceptual evidence to the contrary);
5. lasting beliefs develop if lasting taken-for granted assumptions are not
contradicted by perceptual evidence.
As we noted above, the temporal structure of the belief attitudes matters. It
is helpful in dealing with this issue to use the following notation.
Notation. Let φ(x , t) be a formula, x an object, and t a temporal parameter.
(In our substantive application x denotes a producer and φ denotes one of its
feature values at the time point t .) In the case of the belief modality,
∃ t ′∀t ′′ [(t ′ ≤ t ′′ < t)→ B y φ(x , t
′′)] will be abbreviated as
←−−−
B y φ(x , t);
∃ t ′∀t ′′ [(t < t ′′ ≤ t ′)→ B y φ(x , t
′′)] will be abbreviated as
−−−→
B y φ(x , t).
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The notation is exactly parallel for the other two modalities.
1.2 Defaults and Induction
Audience member’s perceptions of a producer’s fit to schemas for a label are of-
ten partial. In some cases, an audiencemember sees (or treats as a default) only
that a producer claims a label or that some other audience members (perhaps
critics or another kind of gatekeepers) apply the label to the producer. Such
situations offer the analytic leverage needed to define legitimation. The key
issue is how many schema-consistent features an audience member needs to
check (in terms of beliefs) before she assumes conformity with the schema for
the unchecked features.
This idea can be represented in terms of a test code, a partial segment of
a schema that an audience member uses to make inferences about fit to the
rest of the schema on which she has no beliefs (perceptions or defaults). If the
audience member believes that a producer “passes” the test, then she induces
that the unperceived/non-default values of schema-relevant features also fit the
schema. In technical terms, (believed) satisfaction of a test triggers the audience
member to apply the default that the unperceived/non-default feature values
also satisfy the schema.
We first formalize the idea of a test for fit with a schema. It is helpful to
introduce some notation for this task. Let SI denote an indexed set of values of
I features and FJ denote an indexed set of values of some subset of the relevant
features: 0≤ J < I . We use the expression fi ,x,t ∈ si to represent the fact that the
ith feature of the object x has a value that complies with the schema σ(l ,x , t) at
the time point t .
Wemodify thedefinition of induction offeredbyHannan et al. (2007, Def. 4.1),
which holds that induction “fills in” all non-perceived feature values when a test
is perceived to be satisfied. This overlooks the role of existing defaults. Recall
that defaults are beliefs when there is no contrary perception. There does not
appear to be any reason to think that audience members will override existing
defaults based only the passing of a test on other features. So we refine the ear-
lier conception in line with this intuition. That is, we propose that induction
works on features about which the audience member has no belief (based ei-
ther on perception or default).
Definition 4 (Induction from a test). An induction from a test is a situation in
which an audience member’s perception that a producer bears a type label and
that its feature values satisfy a test triggers the audience member to apply the de-
fault that the values of features about which there is no prior belief to the contrary
also satisfy the schema.
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Let σ(l , y, t) = SI .
[INDUC(σ(l , y, t),tJ )↔∀i , j ,x[(l ∈ l(x , y, t))∧ ( j ∈ J)∧ (i ∈ I \ J)
∧ ( B y ( f j ,x,t ∈ tj ))→ (¬ B y ( fi ,x,t 6∈ si ))↔
−−−→
D y ( fi ,x,t ∈ si )]].
In that case, we refer to tJ = {tj | j ∈ J } as y ’s test for judging conformity to the
schema σ(l , y, t), in notation, TST(σ(l , y, t),tJ ), and we say that the test has J
items.
If an audience member must check every relevant feature before assuming
as a default that the rest of a producer’s features match the relevant schema,
then nothing is taken for granted. If only a small fraction of the relevant features
must be checked (perhaps only a claim to the label), then defaults get used in a
powerful way. These comparisons make the most sense when we consider the
minimal test for an audience member-schema pair, the test that involves the
smallest number of features.
Definition 5 (Minimal test for induction). The set of values of the J features,
tJ , is y ’s minimal test for induction for the schema for l at time t, in notation
MT(σ(l , y, t),tJ ), iff (1) it is one of y ’s tests for conformity with the schema; (2) it
no more test features for the schema than any other of y ’s tests; and (3) y induces
satisfaction of the schema σ(l , y, t) on the untested features from this test. (HPC
Def. 4.2)
The relative size of the minimal test for induction for fit to a schema for a
label relates directly to the degree of taken-for-grantedness of the label for the
audience member.
Definition 6 (Taken for grantedness). The degree to which an audience member
takes for granted that the untested feature values of a labeled producer conform to
a schema for the label at a time point is the ratio of the size of the untested portion
of the schema to size of the whole schema. (HPC Def. 4.2)
[g (l ,x , y, t) ≡


(I − J)/I if (〈l ,σ(l , y, t) = SI 〉 ∈ TY(y, t))∧MT(σ(l , y, t),tJ )
∧(l ∈ l(x , y, t));
0 otherwise].
An audience member’s taken for grantedness of a label at the time point is given
by simple average of g over the producers to which she applies the label:
[G(l , y, t) ≡
∑
x|l∈l(x,y,t)
g (l ,x , y, t)
|{x | l ∈ l(x , y, t)}|
].
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Note that I indicates the (crisp) cardinality of the set of schema-relevant features
and J indicates the cardinality of theminimal test. Therefore, this definition sets
g = 0 if the audience member does not apply the label to the object or needs to
see every (nonlabel) feature before making an induction (which is no induction
at all); nothing is taken as satisfied by default. It sets g = 1 if applying the label
by itself shifts the audience member to defaults about schema-conformity on
all other relevant features. In this case, the test on feature values is empty, J = 0;
and the test is passed automatically whenever the label is applied.
A highly taken-for-granted type is referred to as a concept.
Definition 7 (Concept). An audience-segment member’s type is a concept if the
member treats conformity to her schemata for the type label as taken-for-granted
for all those producers/products to which she assigns the label. (HPC Def. 4.5)
[CONCEPT(l , y, t)↔ (〈l ,σ(l , y, t)〉 ∈ ty(y, t))∧ (G(l , y, t)> g≈ 1)].
2 Incomplete Beliefs and Defaults in Typecasting
Clearly, reliance on defaults about concept membership shapes how audience
members regard the producers to whom they apply a label. We claim that de-
faults also play a key role in creating the typecasting dynamic that Zuckerman
et al. (2003) highlight in their study of the careers of Hollywood film actors. This
research finds that actors who are strongly identified with a single type (genre)
of work often find it difficult to obtain future work in other types difficult. Pre-
sumably, audience members assume that each type of work requires a distinct
set of skills, so clear identification with one type of work implies that an actor
lacks the skills necessary for others.
Our understanding of typecasting is that it depends on partiality of available
information. Sometimes audience members have full information about the
properties of some producer and can tell whether it fits one or another schema.
In such situations, there is no reliance on typecasting—the agent relies on direct
perception. But, when perception is incomplete, knowledge that a producer fits
one type generally gets treated as evidence that it likely does not fit other types
(with clashing schemas).
More generally, the typecasting dynamic suggests that the belief that a pro-
ducer is a member of one type will (1) increase the producer’s appeal in ex-
changes of that type and (2) prevent acceptance of its membership in others.
To build to that multiple-type case, we first need to consider how taken-for-
grantedness affects the assignment of GoMs in cases in which test codes are
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satisfied but the audience member does not have a belief about schema satis-
faction for some relevant features. In doing so, we contrast the role of concepts
andmere types.
To simplify our formal story, we construct our arguments at the audience-
member level. These results can be aggregated member by member to derive
implications for an audience. In the interest of brevity, we do not develop these
aggregate implications formally.
We treat simple situations in which fit to a schema can be assessed by sim-
ply countingmatches andmismatches of features to the schema. (Inmore com-
plex cases, there might be weights assigned to features such that mismatches re-
duce fitmore when they occur on certain features or elements of schemasmight
be conditional, meaning that the value of one feature affects what is schema-
conforming on another). We implement this restriction with the notion of a flat
schema.
Definition 8 (Flat schema). An audience member’s schema for a label is flat if
and only if an audience member normally assigns higher grades of membership
to objects with more matches to the schema and fewer mismatches.
Let σ(l , y, t) = SI and let p+(l ,x , y, t) denote the proportion of features values of
x on which y ’s beliefs at t are schema conforming, i.e.,
[p+(l ,x , y, t) =
|{ f | B y fi ,x,t ∈ si }|
|{ f | B y fi ,x,t ∈ si }| + |{ f | B y fi ,x,t ∉ si }|
].
[FLAT(l , y, t)↔Nx ,x ′ [(p+(l ,x , y, t) > p+(l ,x ′, y, t))
→ E{µi (l )(x , y, t)}> E{µi (l )(x
′, y, t)}].
How can we represent the idea that audience members often lack complete
beliefs about schema satisfaction? Because we want tomake the argument gen-
eral and we do not have any prior expectations about patterns, we develop a
simple baseline probability model that allows us to compare situations that are
alike on average. (We state the elements of the probability model as auxiliary
postulates, which means that they are stated as analytical conveniences not as
claims about the world.)
The first step defines a common probability over schema-relevant features
that an audience member lacks a belief. Our baseline model holds that the
schema-relevant features do not differ in the probability that an audiencemem-
ber lacks a belief about conformity to the schema. In otherwords, eachaudience
member has available beliefs on a random sample of schema-relevant features.
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Auxiliary assumption 1 (Beliefs about randomsamples of features). Beliefs about
fit to a schema for a label are available at random for an audience member–
producer pair in the sense that the probability that the audience member does
not have a belief about the value of a feature is the same for all schema-relevant
features.
Let σ(l , y, t) = SI .
A [∃pi∀i[(i ∈ I )→Pr{¬∃v [ B y ( fi ,x,t = v)]}=pi]]].
The key intuition behind typecasting relies on a counterfactual: had the au-
dience member had full information about two producers (who differ in their
histories of prior labels and memberships), she would have no reason to prefer
one to the other. According to the counterfactual, the audience member would
regard the producers as having equal grade of membership in terms of satisfac-
tion of her schema. To represent this notion, we assume as the second element
in the baseline probability model that the two producers being compared are
equally likely to satisfy the audience member’s schema if the audience member
had a positive belief about their values. We do so by assuming that the probabil-
ity that a belief that an arbitrary feature conforms to the schema is the same for
the two producers being compared. In other words, the producers are equiva-
lent in expected-value terms.
Auxiliary assumption 2 (Common probability of schema-conforming beliefs).
The probability that an audience member believes that one of a producer’s feature
values satisfies here schema for a label (conditional on a belief) is the same for all
audience-member–producer pairs.
Let σ(l , y, t) = SI .
A [∃ρ∀i[(i ∈ I )→Pr{ B y ( fi ,x,t ∈ si ) | ∃v[ B y ( fi ,x,t = v)}]=ρ]].
We can now verify that this probability model, when applied to flat schemas,
implies a pattern that agrees with the core intuition about the constraints im-
posed by typecasting. We develop this implication for a simplified situation
which makes the analysis tractable. The simplification considers situations in
which the audience members have flat schemas for two labels, l and l ′, of the
same length (I = I ′),5 has minimal test codes for each schema, and the proba-
bilities that the audiencemember has a belief about a l-schema-relevant feature
5If we allow I , I ′, J , and J ′ to vary freely subject only to the constraint that (I − J )/I > (I ′− J ′)/I ′
(the relevant condition for judging the degree of taken for grantedness), the implications appear
to be indeterminate.
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and that beliefs indicate schema conformity are equal for the two triplets of pro-
ducers, audience members, and time points.
LetΦ[t , t ′]↔
1. l is a concept for the members of the audience over the interval [t , t ′] and
their schemas for it do not change over the interval:
[(t ≤ s ≤ s′ ≤ t ′)→∃SI (l ,y)[(〈l ,SI (l )(y, s)〉 ∈ ty(y, s))
∧ (SI (l , y )(y, s) = SI (l )(y, s
′))]];
2. l ′ is a type for the audience members at (at least) the end point of the
interval:
[∃SI (l ′,y) [〈l
′,SI (l ′,y)(l
′, y, t ′)〉 ∈ ty(y, t ′)]];
3. the audience members’ schemas for l and l ′ are flat over the interval:
[(t ≤ s ≤ t ′)→ FLAT(l , y, s)∧ FLAT(l ′, y, s)];
4. on average, beliefs about the l-relevant and l ′-relevant feature values of all
the producers in the domain are incomplete to the same degree for all au-
dience members over the time interval and all producers fit the audience
member’s schemas for l to the same degree within that interval. In formal
terms, this means that within the period [t , t ′] neither pi nor ρ depends on
the label, the time, the producer or the audience member.
Lemma 1. Under random availability of beliefs for flat schemas with a common
probability of forming a schema-conforming belief, audience members presum-
ably assign higher grades of memberships (to producers) in the meaning of a label
when the conformity with label is more taken for granted.
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧ (I (l , y )= I (l ′ , y ′))∧ (g (l ,x , y, t)> g (l ,x ′, y ′, t ′))
→E{µi (l )(x , y, t)}> E{µi (l )(x
′, y ′, t ′)}].
[The proof of this lemma, along with those of other lemmas and theorems, can
be found in the Appendix.]
According to Lemma 1, an audience member presumably assigns a higher
gradeofmembership to a producer whenherminimal test for induction is smaller
and thus conformity with the schema is more taken for granted. This result has
an immediate implication about the importanceof concepts in situations of par-
tial beliefs.
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Theorem 1. When audience members have partial observations on some type-
relevant producer characteristics, they presumably assign higher grades of mem-
bership in the type to objects when the type is a concept (that is, highly taken for
granted).
P [Φ[s, s′]∧Φ[t , t ′]∧ (I (l , y )= I (l ′ , y ′))∧ CONCEPT(l , y, t)∧¬CONCEPT(l ′, y ′, t ′)
→ E{µi (l )(x , y, t)}> E{µi (l ′)(x
′, y ′, t ′)}].
Because we focus on positively valued types, the argument behind Theo-
rem 1 also implies a parallel difference in the intrinsic appeal of offerings for
concepts versus mere types.
Corollary 1. When audience members have partial observations on some type-
relevant producer characteristics, they presumably find the offerings of members
of the type more appealing when the type is a concept (highly taken-for-granted).
Let the conditions stated in the preamble to the foregoing theorem hold and let
PVT(l , y, t)∧ PVT(l ′, y ′, t ′).
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧ (I (l , y )= I (l ′ , y ′))∧ CONCEPT(l , y, t)∧¬CONCEPT(l ′, y ′, t ′)
→ E{α˜(l ,x , y, t)}> E{α˜(l ′,x ′, y ′, t ′)}].
3 Typecasting
The argument made to this point, together with the behavior of the modalities,
yields what we regard as a somewhat surprising implication. Consider the case
in which an audience member first decides that a producer passes the mini-
mal test code for a concept and does not display any observable violations of
the schema for that concept. She then later finds that the same producer also
passes the minimal test code for a clashing concept and does not display any
observable violations of the schemata for that concept. What happens?
To provide a formal answer to this question, we first define clashes between
schemas.6 To simplify what follows, we define pairs of labels whose schemas
clash (for an audience member) but only outside of their minimal test codes.
6Hannan et al. (2007) define schema clash indirectly with a meaning postulate (MP5.1) that
presumes part ofwhatwewant to derive: “Normally, the higher a producer’s grade ofmembership
in a type whose schema clashes with that of a focal category, the lower the producer’s grade of
membership in the focal type.”
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Definition 9. An audience member’s schemas for a pair of labels clash outside the
minimal test codes.
Let the set of features onwhich the schemas l and l ′ clash for the audiencemem-
ber and time point be denoted by cl+(l , l ′, y, t), that is,
[cl+(l , l ′, y, t) = { fi | ∀t ,x[( fi ∈ SI ∩SI ′)→¬(( fi ,x,t ∈ si )↔ ( fi ,x,t ∈ Si ′))]}];
and let the set of features on which they do not clash be denoted by cl−(l , l ′ , y, t),
that is,
[cl−(l , l ′ , y, t) = { fi | ∀t ,x[( fi ∈ SI ∩SI ′)→ ( fi ,x,t ∈ si )↔ ( fi ,x,t ∈ Si ′)]}].
Finally, let
[(〈l ,SI (t)〉 ∈ ty(y, t))∧ (〈l
′,SI ′ ∈ ty(y, t))∧MT(σ(l , y, t),tJ )∧MT(σ(l
′, y, t),tJ ′ )].
Then schema clash outside minimal test codes is defined as follows:
[CLASH(l , l ′ , y, t)↔∀ j [( j ∈ J ∩ J ′)→ ( j ∉ cl+(l , l ′, y, t))]∧ (cl+(l , l ′, y, t) 6=;)].
As we thought about these issues, we first reasoned that a schema clash
might block an audience member from applying defaults andwould yield a low-
ered GoM in both concepts. But we recognized that the default modality does
not work in this way. Once defaults are set, they have the status of facts (unless
and until they are overridden by new perceptions). So, in the scenarios we are
considering, the audience member treats all of the schema-relevant features as
satisfying the schema and also treats the default-facts as facts when considering
membership in the clashing concept. The result is that the audience member
decides that the producer does not fit well the focal (clashing) concept, and she
does not alter her judgment of the producer’s typicality in the original concept.
This conclusion fits the typecasting imagery.
We now develop this argument formally, building on the argument behind
Theorem 1. The key step in linking this argument to typecasting is constructing
meaningful simplifying assumptions that allow us to capture the key insights.
LetΨ[t , t ′]↔
1. the schemas for l and l ′ clash outside the minimal test codes and schema
clashes outnumber non-clashes from the perspective of all of the audi-
ence members:
[CLASH(l , l ′ , y, t ′)∧ (0< |cl+(l , l ′ , y, t ′)| > |cl−(l , l ′ , y, t ′)|)];
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2. each audience member applies the label l to the producer x and believes
that the producer x passes her minimal test code for l over the relevant
time interval:
[(t ≤ s ≤ t ′)→ (l ∈ l(x , y, s))
∧∃s j∀ j [MTST(l , y, s,tJ )∧ ( j ∈ J)→ B y ( f j ,x,s ∈ s j )]];
3. each audience member either does not apply the label l to the producer
x ′ or does not believe that the x ′ passes her minimal test code for l over
the relevant time interval:
[(t ≤ s ≤ t ′)→ (l ∉ l(x ′, y, s))∨ (∃ j [( j ∈ J)→ B y ( f j ,x′ ,s ∉ s j )])];
4. each audience member applies the label l ′ to both producers at the later
time point t ′: l ′ ∈ l(x , y, t ′)∩ l(x ′, y, t ′).
Theorem 2 (Typecasting). In the case of two concepts with schemas that clash
only outside audience members’ minimal tests for them, membership in one con-
cept at an earlier point in time presumably (1) yields a higher fit to that schema
at subsequent times but (2) reduces the fit to the other schema at a later point
in time (when the audience members do not generally have beliefs about a pro-
ducer’s conformity to schema on all relevant features).
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧Ψ[t , t ′]∧ (t ′ > t)→E{µi (l )(x , y, t
′)}> E{µi (l )(x
′, y ′, t ′)}
∧E{µi (l ′)(x , y, t
′)}< E{µi (l ′)(x
′, y ′, t ′)}].
In the case of positively valued types, the following corollary immediately
follows.
Corollary 2. In the case of two concepts with schemas that clash only outside
audience members’ tests for them, membership in one at an earlier point in time
presumably (1) enhances the intrinsic appeal of the producer’s offering in the first
concept but (2) reduces the appeal of its offering in the other at a later point in
time when the audience members do not generally have beliefs about a producer’s
conformity to schema on all relevant features.
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧Ψ[t , t ′]∧ (t ′ > t)∧ PVT(l , y, t)∧ PVT(l ′, y, t ′)
→ E{α˜(l ,x , y, t ′)}> E{α˜(l ,x ′, y ′, t ′)}∧E{α˜(l ′,x , y, t ′)}< E{α˜(l ′,x ′, y ′, t ′)}].
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Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 highlight both the benefits and the drawbacks
of passing the minimal test code of a highly taken for granted type. On the one
hand, reliance on defaults means that audience members for that type will as-
sign a high grade of membership to the producer and find its offerings to have
high intrinsic appeal. But this restricts the producer’s ability to demonstrate fit
with a clashing type in the future. Audience members will rely on prior defaults
in the case of partial perception and immediately assume a poor fit with the
schema and their tastes for offerings of the clashing type.
4 Contrast, and Taken for Grantedness
Our rendering of the typecasting argument has potentially broad implications.
Exploring them requires attention to related processes underlying taken for grant-
edness (legitimation).
The original theory of density-dependent legitimation held that growth in
thenumber of producers associatedwith a category increases its taken for granted
status (Hannan and Freeman 1989). This basic formulation, however, did not
address the idea that different producers may contribute differentially to the
taken for grantedness of a category. To incorporate this notion and general-
ize the theory, Hannan et al. (2007) shifted attention from density to popula-
tion contrast. Their argument operates at the audience level, and it holds that
a category’s taken-for-granted status increases with the (average) contrast—the
degree to which membership in the meaning of the category approximates a
binary distinction (full membership versus non-membership). Categories with
high contrast stand out sharply against the background, increasing the likeli-
hood that audiencemembers see the cluster of producers in similar ways, which
ease the rise of consensus among audience members about the meaning of the
category label (intensional consensus). Their key postulate states that the level
of legitimation of a label in the audience as a whole increases monotonically
with the level of intensional consensus about the label.
Here we focus on another path, one that links legitimation to contrast at the
audience member level.
Definition 10 (Type contrast). The contrast of a type for an audience member
is the average of the nonzero grades of membership that the audience member
assigns to the objects to which he assigns the type label. (HPC Def. 3.4)
[c(l , y, t) ≡
card{µi (l )(y, t)}
|supp{µi (l )(y, t)}|
],
where supp{µi (l )(y, t)} 6= ;; and it is undefined otherwise. supp{µi (l )(y, t)} refers
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to the support of a fuzzy set, in this case the crisp set of the producers to whom
the audience member assigns nonzero GoM in the meaning of the label.
For an individual audience member, high type contrast means that the pro-
ducers to whom the audience member assigns the type label generally fit the
concept schema well (because high contrast means that the audience member
assigns either high or very low GoM in the meaning of the label to the objects in
the domain). Cases of poor fit to schemas will generally be viewed as exceptions
to the general rule. Such generic fit causes the audience member to come to
take for granted that any producers to which she applies the type label will have
schema-consistent features. The probability that beliefs about schema confor-
mity will become defaults thus increases with contrast.
Postulate 1. A type’s expected taken-for-grantedness for an audience member
normally increases (with some delay) monotonically with its contrast.
N [∃u∀s[(0< s < u)∧ (ci (l )(y, t + s)> ci (l ′)(y, t
′
+ s))
∧ (G(l , t , t + s)=G(l ′, y, t ′+ s))→ E{G(l , t , t +u)> E{G(l ′, y, t ′ +u)}]].
With these notions in hand, we return to our main substantive focus, the
effects of typecasting.
5 De-Novo and De-Alio Entrants
The intuitionunderlying our rendition of the typecasting theorem—that assump-
tions regarding a producerŠsmembership in one concept constrain beliefs about
fit with others—can be usefully extended to shed light on other aspects of the
dynamics of types and concepts. In this section, we demonstrate this by con-
sidering how this process of induction and typecasting relates to key findings on
form emergence. We continue here to build the model at the level of the audi-
ence member.
In their seminal study of the disk-array producers, McKendrick and Carroll
(2001) found that a label for an emerging category gains more legitimation from
de-novo entrants (those with no prior history) than from de-alio entrants (al-
ready existing producers who are diversifying). They reasoned that audience
members perceive de-novo entrants as more focused on the activities associ-
ated with the label than their diversified counterparts and thus contribute more
to audience members’ understandings of what it means to be a type member.
This finding had a serious impact on the thinking of organizational theorists.
However, so far it has not been integrated into the formal theoretical framework
of categories.
17
To captureMcKendrick andCarroll’s core insight, we focus on the case of de-
alio entrants with clashingmemberships. Just as the typecasting dynamic rested
on the assumption that distinct genres correspond to distinct skill sets, the story
about de-novo and de-alio entrants rests on the notion that the different pro-
ducer types are associated with clashing schemas.
Definition 11 (De-novo and de-alio entrants).
A. A producer has de-novo status in a label to an audience member iff the audi-
ence member applies the label at the time point and has not previously applied
any label to it.
[DE-NOVO(l ,x , y, t)↔ (l ∈ l(x , y, t))∧∀t ′[(t ′ < t)→ (l(x , y, t)=;)]];
and the number of de-novo entrants over a time interval (from an audiencemem-
ber’s perspective) is given by
en(l , y, t , t
′ )= |{x | (t ≤u < t ′)∧DE-NOVO(l ,x , y,u)}|.
B. A producer has de-alio-clashing membership in a label (from the perspective of
an audience member) if the audience member applies the label at the time point
and also continues to apply a label assigned earlier in a clashing concept and
believes that the producer passes the minimal test for the clashing concept.
[DE-ALIO(l ,x , y, t)↔ (l ∈ l(x , y, t))∧∀s[(s < t)→ (l ∉ l(x , y, s))]
∧∃l ′, t ′ [CLASH(l ,SI , l
′,SI ′ , y, t)∧ CONCEPT(l
′, y, t)∧ (I = I ′)
∧MTST(σ(l ′, y, t),tJ ′ )∧∀s[(t
′
≤ s < t)→ (l ′ ∈ l(x , y, s))∧
∀ j [( j ∈ J ′)→ B y ( f j ,x,t ∈ tj ′ )]]]];
and the number of de-alio-clashing entrants over a time interval (from an audi-
ence member’s perspective) is given by
ea(l , y, t , t
′ )= |{x | (t ≤ s ≤ t ′)∧DE-ALIO(l ,x , y, s)}|.
When an audience member assesses the fit of a de-alio entrant from a clash-
ing concept to a focal type, the process of induction that drives the typecasting
dynamic (as stated in Theorem 2) is also at work. Membership in the clashing
concept reduces fit of the de-alio entrant in the focal type. This puts the de-alio
entrant at a disadvantage as compared with a comparable de-novo entrant (i.e.,
in the case where there is random availability of beliefs and a common proba-
bility of forming a schema-conforming belief for each producer).
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Theorem 3. De-novo entrants presumably have higher expected grades of mem-
bership in audience members’ types than do de-alio entrants (with memberships
in clashing concepts).
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧Ψ[t , t ′]∧DE-NOVO(l ,x , y, t)∧DE-ALIO (l ,x ′, y ′, t ′)
→ E{µi (l )(x , y, t
′)}> E{µi (l )(x
′, y ′, t ′)}].
This grade of membership disadvantage for de-alio entrants also results in a
disadvantage in terms of the appeal of their offerings to audience members.
Corollary 3. The offerings of de-novo entrants presumably have higher intrinsic
appeal thando those of de-alio entrants (withmemberships in clashing concepts).
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧Ψ[t , t ′]∧DE-NOVO(l ,x , y, t)∧DE-ALIO (l ,x ′, y ′, t ′)
→ E{α˜(l ,x , y, t ′)}> E{α˜(l ,x ′, y ′, t ′)}].
McKendrick and Carroll (2001) suggest that the extent to which audience
members perceive a set of entrants as having a type focus contributes to the
taken for grantedness of the type. This idea of perceptual focus can be analyzed
in terms of contrast, as defined in the previous section. Because de-novo en-
trants have a higher expected grade of membership in an audience member’s
concept, they naturally contribute more to type contrast.
Lemma 2. De-novo entrants presumably contribute more (with some delay) to
the contrast of audience member’s type than de-alio entrants from clashing con-
cepts.
Let the number of entries in two labels be the same over the relevant period
en (l , y, t , t ′ )+ ea(l , y, t , t ′ )= en(l ′, y ′, t , t ′ )+ ea(l ′, y ′, t , t ′ ).
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧Ψ[t , t ′]∧ (en(l , y, t , t
′ )> en (l
′, y ′, t , t ′ ))∧ (c(l , y, t)≥ c(l ′, y ′, t))
→ E{c(l , y, t ′ )}> E{c(l ′, y ′, t ′)}].
The core insight of the de-novo/de-alio story is an implication of the pre-
ceding argument. The implication follows from the foregoing lemmaand Postu-
late 1. Because Lemma 2 yields a difference in the expected contrasts at the end
of the period [t , t ′] and Postulate 1 states a delayed effect of contrast on expected
taken for grantedness, we express the desired theorem as holding for expected
taken for grantedness at some time at or after t ′ (reflecting the possible delay in
the effect of contrast on taken for grantedness).
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Theorem 4 (McKendrick–Carroll). The expected (delayed) contribution of a set of
entrants to the taken for grantedness of a type for an audience member presum-
ably is higher for de-novo than de-alio entrants.
Let the condition stated in the preamble to Lemma 2 hold.
P [Φ[t , t ′]∧Ψ[t , t ′]∧ (en(l , y, t , t
′ )> en (l
′, y ′, t , t ′ ))∧ (c(l , y, t)≥ c(l ′, y ′, t))
→∃u[(u ≥ t ′)∧ (E{G(l , y,u)}> E{G(l ′, y ′,u)})]].
6 Discussion
In this paper, we showed that a model of how audience members apply labels
and assess fits of producers to schema, once extended tomultiple concepts, can
explain the dynamics central to theory fragments of typecasting and form emer-
gence. A core process driving both theories is induction of fit to schemas. Audi-
ence members often rely on defaults regarding schema-relevant features to de-
fine the concept memberships of producers. In the case of partial observation,
this results in their assigning a higher grade of membership to producers for a
concept versus amere type. And in the case ofmultiple memberships, this leads
audience members to assume a producer already affiliated with one concept to
be a poor fit with concepts with clashing schemata.
Our formalization also suggests a similar process of induction drives the
findings byMcKendrick and Carroll (2001) on form emergence. De-alio entrants
are generally believed to have worse fit with a concept schema because they al-
ready belong to a clashing concept. Thus, de-alio entrants are assigned lower
GoMs in a concept than their de-novo counterparts, and they contribute less to
the taken for grantedness of a type.
We developed the model at the level of the audience member by consider-
ing the audience member’s application of labels and assessment of fit to his/her
own schemata for the label. As we noted above, these results have implications
at the level of the audience as a whole. When the members of an audience come
to substantial agreement about themeaning of a set of labels, they will generally
make similar assessments of fit of producers to schemata and engage in induc-
tion based on similar observations. Hence, the line of argument we presented
in this paper appliesmutatis mutandis to a comparison of categories and forms,
the audience-level parallels of types and concepts.
A core tool used to develop our findings is use of modal models. Following
Hannan et al. (2007), we propose that audience members use defaults to fill in
schema-relevant feature values for producers who pass their test for the con-
cept. In the case of highly taken-for-granted types, this test code is very small
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and processes of induction are common. However, for less taken-for-granted
types, a large test means the audience member will not assume much in terms
of conformity with the concept schema. In such cases, the perception opera-
tor largely applies, and only partial membership will be assigned when an au-
dience member lacks a belief about some schema-relevant features. Together,
these modalities capture in a very specific way what seems distinctive about
both membership in highly legitimated types andmembership in multiplemar-
ket types and concepts (categories and forms).
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Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
Testing what follows from the premises in a stage of a theory in the nonmono-
tonic logic we use operates on representations of arguments in the form of “rule
chains.” The links in these chains are strict rules, definitions, auxiliary assump-
tions, and causal stories. The chains start with the subject of the argument and
terminate with the purported conclusion of the argument (the consequence to
be derived). In nonmonotonic inference, different rule chains—each represent-
ing an argument embodied in the state of the theory—might lead to opposing
conclusions. The testing procedure determines whether any inference can be
drawn at all and, if so, which one. Such testing requires standards for assessing
whether a pair of relevant rule chains is comparable in specificity and determin-
ing specificity differences for comparable chains. In the case of this paper, the
available premises and definitions all point in the same direction; we do not see
any rule chains that point to opposing conclusions. Thus all that is required is
that we establish a rule chain that connects the antecedent and consequent in a
claimed theorem.
Lemma 1.
Under the simplification stated in Φ(t) and the baseline probability model and
the absence of induction, the expected ratio of beliefs that feature values fit the
schemas for the two labels to positive beliefs about the relevant feature values
are the same for the two situations being compared for any I and I ′ the ex-
pected ratio equals ρ. Given the restriction to a flat schemas, this implies that
E{µi (l )(x , y, t)} = E{µi (l ′)(x
′, y ′, t ′)} in the absence of induction. So the only sys-
tematic difference between these cases must be due to induction. In particular,
if the expected number of inductions of schema satisfaction is greater for one
situation than the other, then the expected grade of membership is higher for
that situation.
Let the random variable that records the number of inductions be denoted
by in(l ,x , y, t). By the law of total probability,
E{in(l ,x , y, t )} = E{in(l ,x , y, t) |min. test for l passed}·Pr{min. test for l passed}
+0 · (1−Pr{min. test for l passed}),
because no induction takes place if the minimal test is not passed. Under the
baseline probability model stated in Auxiliary Assumptions 1 and 2, the proba-
bility that x passes y ’s minimal test for l equals (piρ)J .
Because inductions canonly apply to features outside the test code (of which
there are I − J for the label l) for which the audience member does not have a
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belief about the value of the feature. The probability of not having a belief on a
feature is 1−pi. So the expected number of inductions, conditional on passing
the minimal test for l is (I − J)(1−pi). Thus in(l ,x , y, t)} = (I − J)(1−pi) · (piρ)J.
Similar calculations yield E{in(l ′ ,x ′, y ′, t ′)}= (I ′− J ′)(1−pi)·(piρ)J
′
. The rule chain
supporting the theorem requires that the expected number of inductions for l
exceeds that for l ′, which requires that (I− J)(1−pi)·(piρ)J > (I ′− J ′)(1−pi)·(piρ)J
′
.
Dropping the common multiplier (1−pi) and setting I = I ′, we check whether
(I − J)κJ > (I − J ′)κJ
′
, where κ=piρ. after rearranging terms, we must show that
I − J
I − J ′
> κJ
′−J .
By Definition 5, g (l ,x , y, t) > g (l ′,x ′, y ′, t ′) yields (I − J)/I > (I ′ − J ′)/I ′ and the
antecedent states that I = I ′ . Together these conditions imply that J ′ > J . This
latter inequality in turn implies that (I − J)/(I − J ′) > 1 and κJ
′−J < 1 (because
κ = piρ and the antecedent in the formula stating the lemma states that both pi
and ρ lie between zero andone). So the expected number of inductions is higher
for l the type for which the producer x higher taken for grantedness in y ’s view,
which implies that x’s expected fit to y ’s meaning of l is higher than is the case
for the other comparison.
Theorem 1.
The definition of a concept as a pair of label and schema for which an audience
member has a very high level of taken-for-grantedness tells that the relative size
of the minimal test for l is smaller than that for l ′. With this inequality granted,
the argument chain behind Lemma 1 applies.
Corollary 1.
The rule chain linking the antecedent and consequent results from application
of the chain rule to the (rule chain supporting) Theorem 1 and the definition of
a positively valued type (Definition 3).
Theorem 2.
In the absence of induction, the expected fit of both producers is the same for
each label under the assumptions stated in the definition of Ψ[t , t ′], because
the audience member’s schemas for the labels are flat and the probability that
a schema-relevant feature will be observed is the same as is the probability that
a positive belief will be one of schema conformity for each label. Induction can
produce both increased fit (when the feature value induced fits the schema) and
reduced fit (when the induction goes the other way).
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In the case of the first term in the consequent (fit to l), the result follows
from the assumption that the audiencemember believes that x passes themini-
mal test at all points in the interval and no information is available about such a
belief for the second producer, x ′. It then follows that inductionwill normally in-
crease the fit to l for one producer (x) but not the other (x ′). Under the assump-
tion that clashes outnumber non-clashes, the expected net effect of induction is
to reduce the fit of x to the second label (l ′) relative to that of x ′.
Corollary 2.
The rule chain linking the antecedent and consequent results from application
of the cut rule to the (rule chain supporting) Theorem 2 and the definition of a
positively valued type (Definition 3).
Theorem 3.
According to Definition 10, a producer is a de-novo entrant in a label if the au-
dience member applies the label at that time point and does not apply any label
to the producer at any earlier time point. A producer is a de-alio-entrant (from a
clashing concept) if the audiencemember applies the focal label to the producer
and has earlier applied to it the label of a clashing concept. In such a compar-
ison, the rule chain that supports Theorem 2 applies; and this rule chain yields
the conclusion.
Corollary 3.
The rule chain that supports this implication relies on the application of the cut
rule to the (rule chain behind) Theorem 3 and Definition 3.
Lemma 2
This is an immediate implication of Theorem 3, which tells that each de-novo
entrant has higher expected GoM in the audience member’s type than does a
de-alio entrant. Definitions 11 and 12 tell that an entrant with higher GoM
increases contrast more than does one with lower GoM, which implies that a
de-novo entrant adds more to contrast. Addition over entries preserves this in-
equality, given the stipulation that the number of de-novo entries is at least as
great as the number of de-alio entries.
Theorem 4.
This theorem follows froma cut rule applied to (the rule chain supporting) Lemma2
and Postulate 1.
24
References
Bogaert, Sandy, Christophe Boone, and Glenn R. Carroll. 2006. Contentious le-
gitimacy: Professional associations and density dependence in the audit
industry 1884–1939. Presented at the Organizational Ecology Conference,
Sintra, Portugal. June.
Boone, Christophe, CarolynDeclerck,HayagreevaRao, andKristin VanDenBuys.
2008. Out of tune: The rise and fall ofmodernistic music in Brussels: 1919–
1939. Faculty of Economics, University of Antwerp.
Carroll, Glenn R. and Anand Swaminathan. 2000. Why the microbrewery move-
ment? Organizational dynamics of resource partitioning in the U.S. brew-
ing industry. Am. J. Soc. 106:715–62.
Hannan, Michael T. 2008. Partiality: Niches and categories. Presented at the No-
bel Symposium, Foundations of Organizations. Saltsjöbaden, Sweden.
Hannan,Michael T., László Pólos, and GlennR. Carroll. 2007. Logics of organiza-
tion theory: Audiences, codes, and ecologies. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Hsu, Greta. 2006. Jacks of all trades andmasters of none: Audiences’ reactions to
spanning genres in feature film production. Admin. Sci. Quart. 51:420–50.
Hsu, Greta, Michael T. Hannan, and Özgecan Koçak. 2009. Multiple category
memberships in markets: An integrated theory and two empirical tests.
Am. Soc. Rev. in press.
Koçak, Özgecan, Michael T. Hannan, and Greta Hsu. 2008. Enthusiasts and the
structure of markets. Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Koçak,Özgecan,GiacomoNegro, andFabrizio Perretti. 2008. Switching domains:
Actors’ careers across films and television. Presented at the Annual Meet-
ing of the European Group on Organisational Studies, Amsterdam, July.
McKendrick, David G. and Glenn R. Carroll. 2001. On the genesis of organiza-
tional forms: Evidence from themarket for disk drive arrays.Org. Sci. 12:661–
83.
McKendrick, David G., Jonathan Jaffee, Glenn R. Carroll, and Olga M. Khessina.
2003. In the bud? Disk array producers as a (possibly) emergent organiza-
tional form. Admin. Sci. Quart. 48:60–93.
Negro, Giacomo, Michael T. Hannan, and Hayagreeva Rao. 2008. Category con-
trast and appeal: Nichewidth and critical success in winemaking. Stanford
Graduate School of Business.
25
Pólos, László and Michael T. Hannan. 2002. Reasoning with partial knowledge.
Soc. Methodology 32:133–81.
2004. A logic for theories in flux: A model-theoretic approach. Logique et
Analyse 47:85–121.
Pólos, László, Michael T. Hannan, and Greta Hsu. 2008. Modal constructions in
sociological arguments. Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Pontikes, Elizabeth G. 2008. Fitting in or starting new? An analysis of invention,
constraints, and the emergence of new categories in the software industry.
Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
Rao, Hayagreeva, Philippe Monin, and Rudolphe Durand. 2005. Border cross-
ing: blending and erosion of categorical boundaries in French gastron-
omy. Am. Soc. Rev. 70: 968–91.
Ruef, Martin. 2000. The emergence of organizational forms: A community ecol-
ogy approach. Am. J. Soc. 106:658–714.
Zuckerman, Ezra W. 1999. The categorical imperative: Securities analysts and
the legitimacy discount. Am. J. Soc. 104:1398–1438.
Zuckerman, Ezra W. and Tai-Young Kim. 2003. The critical trade-off: Identity
assignment and box-office success in the feature film industry. Ind. Corp.
Change 12:27–67.
Zuckerman, Ezra W., Tai-Young Kim, Kalinda Ukanwa, and James von Rittman.
2003. Robust identities or non-entities? Typecasting in the feature film la-
bor market. Am. J. Soc. 108:1018–1074.
26
